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THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMAN
WELFARE SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
Stephan Leibfriedt
Welfare programs are a fundamental part of the political and social
structure of the United States and West Germany. The national legisla-
tures of both countries have used broad constitutional powers' to establish
comprehensive statutory welfare systems.2 Strong industrial economies
provide revenues to support the systems,3 and persistent unemployment
- Professor of Welfare Law and Social Policy, University of Bremen. Ph.D. 1972, Uni-
versity of Bremen; Assessor 1974, West Berlin. The author wishes to thank Professors Peter W.
Martin, Gunther Arzt, and Florian Tennstedt for their many valuable comments and sugges-
tions. The author also wishes to thank James F. Bauerle, Cornell Law School class of 1979, for
his assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "provide for the. . . General Welfare."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Among the concurrent legislative powers that the West German
Federal Constitution, the Grundgesetz [GG], grants to the German federation and its constitu-
ent states is the power to legislate regarding "public welfare" and "labour law ... as well as
social insurance, including unemployment insurance .. " GG art. 74, §§ 7, 12, reprinted in
5 A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 36-37
(1974) (XV. Ger.).
2. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2027 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
644 (1976) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children); id. §§ 1381-1385 (Supplemental Secur-
ity Income); id. §§ 1396-1396k (medicaid); id. §§ 5301-5317 (housing assistance). Federal So-
cial Assistance Act (Bundessozialhilfegesetz) [BSHG], June 30, 1961, [1961] Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI] 1 815, corrected[1961] BGBI 11875, asreformulatedFeb. 13, 1976, [1976] BGBI 1289,
corrected [1976] BGB1 1 1150. For the most current overview on the BSHG and all its legal
implications, including the impact of judicial decisions, see A. KNOPP & 0. FICHTNER,
BUNDESSOZIALHILFEGESETZ-KOMMENTAR (1979).
3. The 1977 gross national products per capita of the United States and West Ger-
many-8,715 and $8,317 respectively (in constant (1977) dollars)-were higher than all other
European nations in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development except
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1978, at 910 [hereinafter cited as STATIsTI-
CAL ABSTRACT]. For a more general comparative approach to the relationship between gross
national product and welfare expenditures, see Leibfried, Public Assistance in the United States
and the Federal Republic of German.y: Does Social Democracy Make a Differences 11 CoM-
PARATIVE POLITICS 59 (1978).
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helps keep a large class of persons4 in need of government assistance.5
Both welfare systems are well established 6 and have undergone periodic
reform.7
This Article presents a structural comparison of the U.S. and West
German welfare systems.8 The two systems will first be described briefly.
A detailed examination will then be made of three areas in which the two
systems differ fundamentally-legal programming, administration, and
financing. The Article will consider how enactment of President Carter's
Program for Better Jobs and Income9 would have strengthened or weak-
ened these contrasts between the two systems. Because it is the most receni
comprehensive U.S. reform proposal and a direct extension of past reforms,
the Carter plan provides the best means to study the movement toward fed-
eralization of the U.S. welfare system.' 0 The analysis will conclude by
4. Of the 25.3 million persons in the West German civilian labor force, 3.6% were unem-
ployed in 1977, whereas 7.0% of the U.S. work force of 97.4 million persons were unemployed
during the same period. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 915.
5. Another cause of this phenomenon in the United States is the absence of a satisfactory
minimum wage level and the existence of a class of persons wholly divorced from the labor
market (for a number of complex reasons which cannot be discussed here).
6. Categorical federal public assistance in the United States is over 40 years old, having
been established by the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976). See J.
AXINN & H. LEVIN, SOCIAL WELFARE 183-88 (1975); J. LIEBY, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WEL-
FARE AND SOCIAL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 227-36 (1978). In 1937, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act of 1935, the cornerstone
of present income transfer programs. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
The West German Federal Social Assistance Act is 18 years old, but comprehensive federal-
ization of social assistance dates to 1924. The first action of national significance occurred in
1871, when the central government enforced the right to free movement nationally with respect
to local welfare systems.
7. See, e.g., Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1977,7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2027 (West Supp.
1979); Social Security Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1976) (establishing SSI
program); R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY (1975) (overview of
effectiveness of reforms undertaken from 1964 to 1974); E. OESTREICHER, BUNDESSOZIAL-
HILFEGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, annots. 28-29e, 59 (1978) (complete listing of amendments to the
BSHG and short descriptions of their nature. See also H. Niedrig & H.-C. Hoppensack,
Sozialhiyfe vor der Demontage?-Sozialstaat in der Bewdhrung, [1977] THEORIE UND PRAXIS
DER SOZIALEN ARBEIT 363 (summary of past reform trends and an introduction to present
reform tendencies).
8. Similar patterns of socioeconomic development make a comparison of the United
States and West Germany more useful than a comparison of the United States and other
continental countries. See J. KOCKA, ANGESTELLTE ZWISCHEN FASCHISMUS UND DEMOKRA-
TIE 39-45 (1977).
9. H.R. 9030, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H9283 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. 9030].
10. See generally President's Message to Congress Transmitting Program for Better Jobs
and Income, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1205 (Aug. 6, 1977); Administralion r Welfare
Reform Proposal Joint Hearings on H., 9030 Before the Welfare Reform Subcomm. of the
House Com.'m on Agriculture, House Comm on Education and Labor, and House Comm. on
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assessing the implications of the different system structures for welfare re-
form in the United States.
Two restrictions will further focus the analysis. It will concentrate on
welfare programs in the domestic political context, without considering the
socioeconomic implications of the issues under discussion. The analysis
will also be confined to cash assistance and food stamp programs and will
not encompass health care, housing assistance, and social insurance pro-
grams.
I
THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMAN
WELFARE SYSTEMS
Before receiving public support, twenty-one million American fami-
lies, or one out of every four, had economic resources below the U.S. Gov-
ernment's poverty threshold in fiscal 1976."1 In an attempt to assist these
families, the Government paid them $44.7 billion in welfare benefits during
1976.12 Three federal programs, along with state general assistance plans,
form the core of this welfare system.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)13 is the U.S. Gov-
ernment's major cash assistance program. It reaches indigent families with
children who have at least one absent or incapacitated parent. In twenty-
four states, families in which the father is unemployed are also eligible for
AFDC. 14 Enacted in 1935,15 AFDC is administered by the states under
rules prescribed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW).' 6 More than eleven million persons received assistance totaling
$9.6 billion under the program in 1976.17
Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]; HOUSE
WELFARE REFORM SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, COMM. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, AND COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, EXPLANATORY MATERIAL TO ACCOMPANY H.R.
10950, THE BETTER JOBS AND INCOME ACT, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (summary and sec-
tional explanation); J. STOREY, R. HARRIS, F. LEVY, A. FECHTER & R. MICHEL, THE BETTER
JOBS AND INCOME PLAN (1978).
11. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, WELFARE RE-
FORM xxi (1977) [hereinafter cited as WELFARE REFORM]. The poverty income standard for a
nonfarm family of four in 1976 was $5,670. J. STOREY, R. HARRIS, F. LEVY, A. FECHTER & R.
MICHEL, supra note 10, at 9.
12. WELFARE REFORM, supra note II, at xxi.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1976).
14. Id. § 607(a).
15. Social Security Act of 1935,42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f(1976). For a review of the evolu-
tion of AFDC, see Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure ofthe AFDC Program Since 1935, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1974).
16. 45 C.F.R. §§ 204-206, 213, 220, 224, 231-237 (1978).
17. WELFARE REFORM, supra note 11, at 23 (1977).
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The food stamp program'8 provides assistance in kind in an attempt to
assure poor persons an adequate diet.' 9 Participants receive an allotment of
food stamps, 20 which they use as cash substitutes in purchasing groceries.
To be eligible, an applicant must pass a means test2 ' and a work require-
ment.22 Created by the Food Stamp Act of 1964,23 the program is adminis-
tered by state welfare agencies2 4 pursuant to federal regulations. 25 Benefits
distributed to eighteen million recipients in fiscal 1976 totaled $5.3 billion,26
all of which came from federal sources.
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI)2 7 was established
by Congress in 1972 to replace the previous AFDC-like grant-in-aid pro-
grams for the aged, blind, and disabled.28 SSI was designed to provide
national minimum income support to those who qualify 29 and to reduce
eligibility requirements other than lack of income.30 The Federal Govern-
18. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2027 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
19. See generally A. LA FRANCE, M. SCHROEDER, R. BENNETT & W. BOYD, LAW OF THE
POOR 259-60 (1973).
20. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2013 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979). Prior to January 1, 1979, most food
stamp recipients purchased food stamps at less than face value. The amount of the discount or
"bonus value" depended on the recipient's need. This purchase requirement was abolished by
the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2027 (West Supp. 1979), and implementing
regulations issued by the Department of Agriculture, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,846 (1978) (to be codified
in 7 C.F.R.). The Act and regulations are the "most major overhaul in the program's history"
and are designed "to tighten administration of the program and [to] redirect benefits to needier
persons." 2 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 26,972.
21. The means test consists of two parts, an assets test, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,900 (1978) (to be
codified in 7 C.F.R. § 273.8), and an income test, id. at 47,903 (to be codified in 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.9(a)), both of which the applicant must satisfy in order to qualify for benefits. See M.
MACDONALD, FOOD, STAMPS, AND INCOME MAINTENANCE 23 (1977).
22. Certain employable persons in families receiving food stamps must register for work at
a state or local employment office and accept reasonable offers of employment. 43 Fed. Reg.
47,898 (1978) (to be codified in 7 C.F.R. § 273.7); M. MACDONALD, supra note 21, at 37.
23. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2025 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
24. Id. § 2020. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18900-18919 (West Supp. 1979).
25. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,881 (1978) (to be codified in 7 C.F.R. §§ 271-282).
26. WELFARE REFORM, supra note 11, at 23. In fiscal 1977, $5.5 billion in benefits was
paid to 17 million recipients.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1976).
28. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON THE SUP-
PLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM 3 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as SSI RE-
PORT]. SSI was designed "to take the income maintenance functions previously handled by
the State welfare agencies and transform them into something which could be handled by the
Social Security Administration largely in the way in which it had always handled social secur-
ity benefits." Id. at 24. The House Ways and Means Committee estimated that states would
save $1.5 billion during the first year of the program compared to their expenditures under
prior law. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4989, 4993.
29. H.R. REP. No. 231, supra note 28, at 4992.
30. Id. As with AFDC, see note 21 supra, eligibility is determined by a two part means
test with an income element and an asset element. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1976).
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ment administers SS131 and paid $6 billion in benefits to 4.4 million recipi-
ents in 1976.32
General assistance describes those remaining welfare programs in
which the Federal Government takes no part.33 Funded and administered
by state and local governments, 34 general assistance plans provide benefits
in cash or in kind to poor persons not covered by AFDC or SSI.35 Because
the Federal Government exercises no control over general assistance pro-
grams, states may make benefits available on either an emergency or a
long-term basis and the amount of benefits paid varies greatly from state to
state.36 In fiscal 1976, nearly one million persons received general assist-
ance benefits totaling $1.2 billion.37
Public assistance in West Germany consists of a nationwide income
maintenance program established under the Federal Social Assistance
Act.3 8 The Act provides two forms of assistance: "basic aid" 39 and "special
aid."' 40 Basic aid has two components. "Continuous support" covers ordi-
nary, recurring expenditures, such as food, energy, and rent; "special sup-
port" covers extraordinary, nonrecurring expenditures, such as furniture,
appliances, and major clothing expenses. The West German Government
provides special aid either wholly or partly in lieu of basic aid in certain
circumstances. Principal types of special aid are homemaker care, attend-
ant care, rehabilitation services for the handicapped, and medical care.
41
31. Id. § 1383b. Regulations governing SSI appear at 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1978).
32. WELFARE REFORM, supra note 11, at 23.
33. J. STOREY, WELFARE IN THE 70's, at 23 (1974).
34. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18450-18524 (West 1972); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§§ 157-166 (McKinney 1976).
35. Although general assistance plans are designed to aid those not provided for by
AFDC or SSI, the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that New York may not condition
receipt of general assistance benefits on nonreceipt of SSI benefits. Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d
453, 462-63, 373 N.E.2d 247, 251-52, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351, 356-57 (1977).
36. "The comprehensiveness of GA programs runs the gamut, from locally run programs
offering only free groceries and shelter on an emergency basis, to statewide programs offering
long-term cash supplements to any needy person not covered under AFDC or SSI." J. STO-
REY, supra note 33, at 23.
37. WELFARE REFORM, supra note 11, at 23.
38. BSHG, supra note 2. For a description and analysis of the West German system, see
Leibfried, Public Assistance in the Federal Republic of Germany: "Take Up" of Benefts and the
Structure of Welfare Bureaucracy, in J. JOWELL & M. PARTINGTON, SOCIAL POLICY AND WEL-
FARE LAW 169-94 (1979).
39. BSHG §§ 11-25 (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhal).
40. Id. §§ 27-75 (Hilfen in besonderen Lebenslagen).
41. When taken together, these services accounted for 90% of the special aid benefits paid
in 1975. Homemaker and attendant care services for the handicapped received DM 2.9 billion
(54.8%), rehabilitation for the handicapped DM 1.3 billion (24.5%), and medical care DM 0.6
billion (11.5%). Total special aid benefits in 1975 were DM 5.3 billion with 1.147 million
recipients in the special aid category. In contrast, basic aid expenditures amounted to DM 3
billion in 1975 with 1.190 million recipients sharing in these benefits. Due to an overlap of
1979]
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Recipients are entitled to both basic and special aid as a matter of right. In
1975, for the first time since the adoption of the Federal Social Assistance
Act, more than two million persons received aid under this program. 42
The welfare systems of the United States and West Germany thus con-
sist largely of government-administered cash transfers and serve many of
the same purposes. Yet the differences between the two systems outweigh
the similarities. It is to these differences that the focus now shifts in order to
highlight the distinctive features of each system and assess reform patterns
in the United States by comparing legal programming, administration, and
financing in the two national welfare systems.
II
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. LEGAL PROGRAMMING
Legal programming is the process of establishing the content of a wel-
fare program-eligibility requirements, form and amount of benefits, ad-
ministrative procedures, quality control methods, and so forth. Enactment
of welfare programs by statute and revision of them by amendment is the
most basic form of programming. Yet the national legislature may delegate
legal programming responsibility to state or local governments or to admin-
istrative agencies. Courts too may exercise an important influence over
both the process and the result of legal programming. The U.S. and West
German welfare systems exhibit marked differences in the allocation of le-
gal programming responsibility and in the influence that courts exert over
the legal programming process. These differences help produce dissimilar
benefit structures in the two national welfare systems.
L Organization of Legal Programming Responsibility
Legal programming occurs at different levels of government in the
United States and West Germany, with state and local governments con-
ducting much more programming in the United States. When Congress
established most American welfare programs, it vested state and local gov-
ernments with principal legal programming responsibility.43 Recent judi-
basic and special aid, the total number of recipients-2.049 million-is smaller than the sum of
the two components of West Germany's welfare scheme. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT,
SOZVALHILFEAUFWAND 1975, in [1976] WIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTnK 581; STATISTISCHES
BUNDESAMT, SOZIALHILFEEMPFANGER 1975, in [1977] WIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK 325.
42. In 1963, there were 1.491 million welfare recipients or 26 recipients per 1,000
inhabitants. In 1975, there were 2.049 million recipients or 33 per 1,000 inhabitants. See
SOZIALHILFEEMPF.iNGER 1975, supra note 41, at 324.
43. For example, under the original legislative authorization for the food stamp program,
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cial decisions,44 federal administrative regulations, and congressional
enactments45 have enlarged the role of the Federal Government. But state
and local governments continue to promulgate many of the rules and regu-
lations implementing federal welfare statutes. The AFDC program illus-
trates this pattern: each state is free to decide whether to have an AFDC
program, to choose among several coverage options, 46 and to establish the
need test and benefit level 47 for AFDC recipients within its jurisdiction.
By contrast, most legal programming in the West German welfare sys-
tem occurs on the national level.48 The Federal Government determines
the standards of eligibility, the time and manner of benefit payments, and
[t]he program. . . was basically state-oriented. The Act placed the responsibility for
establishing the food stamp program in state agencies authorized to administer assist-
ance programs. The federal government established the purchase requirements for the
full stamp allotment and bore the cost of the bonus stamps, but individual states speci-
fied eligibility standards.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM 3-4 (1977). Similarly, "ADC-now AFDC... was conceived as a State program,
with the Federal government simply helping by paying one-third of the bill .... During the
first decades of the program, the Federal government, including the Congress, was content to
leave the program in State hands." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFDC PROGRAM 12
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as AFDC ADMINISTRATION].
44. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). But see Quern v. Mandlay, 98 S. Ct. 2068 (1978) (states
may choose to operate emergency assistance programs that have more restrictive eligibility
requirements than the federal program).
45. Eg., Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1977, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2027 (West Supp.
1979); Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1976) (establishing
SSI program).
46. Eg., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (states may offer welfare benefits to preg-
nant women for unborn children but are not required to do so); 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976) (AFDC
coverage for dependent children with unemployed fathers).
47. "A State Plan for. . . AFDC ... must. . . [s]pecify a statewide standard, expressed
in money amounts, to be used in determining (a) the need of applicants and recipients and (b)
the amount of the assistance payment." 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) (1978). See also 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 387 (1962) (certification standards and procedures for federal food stamp pro-
gram); id. § 388 (AFDC work incentive program regulations).
48. Compare the BSHG with a series of decrees (Verordnungen) based on it: Verordnung
zur Durchftlhrung des § 22 BSHG (Regelsatzverordnung), July 20, 1962, [1962] BGBI
I 515, as amended May 10, 1971, [1971] BGBI I 451; Verordnung zur Durchftihrung des
§ 24(2)(1) BSHG, June 28, 1974, [1974] BGBI I 1365; Verordnung nach §47 BSHG
(Eingliederungshilfe-Verordnung), May 27, 1964, [1964] BGB1 I 339, as reformulated Feb. 1,
1975, [1975] BGB1 I 433; Verordnung zur Durchfihrung des § 72 des BSHG, June 9, 1976,
[1976] BGBI 11469; Verordnung zur Durchftthrung des § 76 des BSHG, Nov. 28, 1962, [19621
BGB 1 692, as amended Nov. 23, 1976, [1976] BGB 1 13234; Verordnung zur Durchfithrung
des § 81(1) no. 3 des BSHG, May 12, 1975, [1975] BGBI I 1109; Verordnung zur
Durchftlhrung des § 88(2) no. 8 des BSHG, Nov. 9, 1970, [1970] BGB1 1 1529, as amended
June 14, 1974, [1974] BGBI 1 1292. The single most important decree is the Regelsatzver-
ordnung. See generally K. PETERSEN, DIE REGELSATZE NACH DEM BSHG (1972); note 50
infra. Also important are the decree on assets and income tests (Verordnung zur
Durchftlhrung des § 76 BSHG) and the decree giving shape to rehabilitation of the handi-
capped (Eingliederungshilfe-Verordnung).
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some rules governing benefit levels.49 In addition, the Deutscher Vereinfir
dffentliche undprivate Ftirsorge, a private organization composed of public
and private institutions active in the welfare field, has exercised an impor-
tant influence on benefit levels by securing the consent of both federal and
state authorities to a uniform yet flexible "needs basket" of welfare bene-
fits.50 State and local governments are responsible for supplementary bene-
fits that they provide, such as the aid to the blind dispensed by the Liinders5
and the Christmas assistance provided by the cities.52 But the dominant
role of legal programming still belongs to the Federal Government, com-
plemented by the Deutscher Verein.
This different organization of legal programming responsibility signifi-
cantly affects the content of the American and West German welfare sys-
tems. The delegation of primary legal programming authority to state and
local governments in the United States prevents the establishment of a na-
tional minimum benefit level. Because each state in the AFDC program is
free to prescribe its own need test and benefit levels,53 a one-parent family
of four in Hawaii receives nearly three times the AFDC and food stamp
benefits as a similar family in Mississippi.5 4 By contrast, the dominant legal
49. See BSHG §§ 1, 11-16, 18, 76-78 (eligibility conditions for basic aid); BSHG §§ 3, 22-
24 (some principles concerning benefit levels in basic aid); BSHG § 5 (time of payment);
BSHG §§ 8 (1), 21 (manner of payment). See also note 48 supra.
50. On the basis of the needs basket, the Federal Government promulgated the Ver-
ordnung zur Durchfiihrung des § 22 BSHG, note 49 supra. This Verordnung accords state au-
thorities wide regulatory powers, which, if used, could lead to widely divergent benefit levels.
But the state authorities' practice of consenting to the application of the needs basket of the
Deutscher Verein prevents the development of any wide disparity in benefit levels. Differences
are small and due only to regional price differences of the needs basket. Its price is redeter-
mined regularly to keep pace with regional price developments and inflation. The difference
in 1977 between the highest Regelstz-DM 292 in Hessen-and the lowest-DM 280 in Saar-
land-was only DM 12. The average was DM 287 for a single person. See Rege/sttze nach
§ 22 des Bundessozialhifegesetzes im Bundesgebiet und in Berlin (West), 57 NACH-
RICHTENDIENST DES DEUTscHEN VEREINS FUR OFFENTLICHE UND PRIVATE FiJRSOROE 55
(1977). If the Deutscher Verein did not exist, straightforward federalization would obtain. See
K. PETERSEN, supra note 48, at 54.
The continuous readjustment of benefit levels (indexing) is not done according to a mechan-
ical rule. Rather it is performed in consultation with "persons with experience in the field of
welfare" (sozial erfahrene Persenlichkeften). BSHG § 114(l). This procedure permits some
bargaining and often extends to the local government level the private government structure
found at the national level in the establishment of the standard needs basket. The same con-
sultation takes place when general internal administrative rules (allgemeine Verwaltungsvor-
schrpi en) are promulgated, id, and when internal administrative appeals are heard, id
§ 114(2).
51. See 0. MERGLER, G. ZINK, E. DAHLINGER & H. ZEITLER, BUNDESSOZIALHILFE-
GEETZ-KOMMENTAR § 67, annot. 36 (1975) (listing the state laws governing aid to the blind).
52. It is unclear whether Christmas assistance is an integral part of the basic federal wel-
fare scheme. Id. § 12, annot. 36.
53. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
54. The Mississippi family would be eligible to receive $2,712 per year in AFDC and food
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programming role of the West German Federal Government and the
Deutscher Verein55 makes it possible for that system to come much closer to
achieving a national minimum benefit level.56 Supplementary assistance
programs of state and local governments as well as different regional price
levels produce some deviation from a national standard, but these varia-
tions are minor. In the United States, decentralized programming com-
bined with the categorical character of U.S. programs5 7 leaves states largely
in control of the effect of welfare programs on family structure"s and
work,5 9 because the states alone determine the level of support for recipi-
ents outside the federally-administered categories of assistance.
The Carter reform proposal would have greatly expanded the U.S.
Government's legal programming responsibility by consolidating program-
ming functions in the Federal Government, establishing a scale of national
minimum benefits,60 and prescribing uniform benefit reduction levels for
earned income.6 1 These changes would have extended to the entire welfare
system the process of federalization that has occurred on a limited basis
through judicial and administrative changes in AFDC 62 and through con-
gressional enactment of SSI. By federalizing the entire system, the Carter
plan would have ended the existing patchwork of need tests and benefit
standards and would have eliminated significant aspects of state control
over the effect of welfare programs on family structure and work. These
changes would have reduced the disparity in legal programming patterns
between the United States and West Germany.
stamps whereas the Hawaii family could receive $7,044. S. DANZIGER, R. HAVEMAN & E.
SMOLENSKY, THE PROGRAM FOR BETTER JOBS AND INCOME (1977). Compare Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-17-5 (Supp. 1978) (providing benefits of $60 per month for the first child, $36 per
month for the second, and $24 per month for each additional child) with N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 131-a (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978) and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.2 (1962) (providing benefits
of $94 per month for the first person in the household, $56 for the second, $50 for the third, $58
for the fourth, $60 for the fifth, and $50 for each additional person).
55. See notes 48 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
56. Id. Different social situations of recipients and different administrative practices miti-
gate somewhat this tendency toward a national minimum benefit level. See S. Leibfried, Intro-
duction, in F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULIERUNG DER ARMUT 27-28, 36, 46,49-64 (1977).
57. See notes 104-05 infra and accompanying text.
58. See S. DANZIGER, R. HAVEMAN & E. SMOLENSKY, supra note 54, at 4.
59. See id.
60. H.R. 9030, supra note 9, §§ 2104-2106. "A four person family with no income and no
member expected to work would receive a benefit ... of $4,200 a year." CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE ADMINISTRATION'S WELFARE RE-
FORM PROPOSAL 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL].
61. H.R. 9030, supra note 9, § 2106. Benefits would have been reduced by $.50 for each
dollar of earned income, id. § 2106(a)(3), and by $.80 for each dollar of nonemployment in-
come, id. § 2106(a)(2).
62. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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2. Role a/the Courts
Although legal programming of the welfare system is subject to judi-
cial review in both the United States and West Germany, American and
West German courts have taken markedly different roles in shaping the
direction of legal programming. Contrasting organization of legal pro-
gramming responsibilities has produced different jurisdictional patterns.
Welfare clients in the United States have had greater legal resources avail-
able for litigating test cases. Perhaps as a result, American courts, espe-
cially the Supreme Court, have exercised a stronger influence over the
direction of welfare policy than their West German counterparts, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesverwaltungsgericht.
Court jurisdiction over welfare law cases mirrors the different alloca-
tion of legal programming responsibility in the United States and West
Germany. Jurisdiction is divided between state and federal courts in the
United States. State courts hear cases arising under state general assistance
programs63 as well as some cases in which state administration of federal
welfare laws is at issue.64 Federal courts exercise jurisdiction over cases
arising under SSI and certain federal aspects of the AFDC and food stamp
programs. 65 In addition, welfare recipients may institute a federal class ac-
tion to challenge a state policy or rule in federal court. In West Germany, a
more homogeneous and functionally specialized system of administrative
courts hears all public law cases66 ,that do not fall within a more specialized
public law jurisdiction. Althoughl the social welfare courts are the special-
ized courts that would most logically be responsible for welfare cases, their
jurisdiction is limited to social insurance and similar matters,67 and does
63. E.g., Sabot v. Lavine, 42 N.Y.2d 1068, 369 N.E.2d 1173, 399 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1977);
Baumes v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 296, 342 N.E.2d 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975).
• 64. E.g., Waits v. Swoap, I1 Cal. 3d 887, 524 P.2d 117, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974); Payne v.
Sugarman, 39 A.D.2d 720, 331 N.Y.S.2d 813, a'd, 31 N.Y.2d 845, 292 N.E.2d 304, 340
N.Y.S.2d 162 (1972). State courts hear many suits that might otherwise be brought in federal
court because of restrictions recently imposed by the United States Supreme Court on the
ability of plaintiffs to recover benefits retroactively. The Court held that "a federal court's
remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds
from the state treasury." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (citations omitted).
65. But federal courts do not take jurisdiction over all claims under U.S. welfare laws.
Recipients must establish that their case presents a "substantial constitutional claim." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-39 (1974). In order to take cognizance of claims arising out of the
administration of the food stamp program, federal courts have exercised their original jurisdic-
tion over actions arising under federal statutes regulating interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Tyson v. Norton, 390 F. Supp. 545 (D. Conn. 1975), aj'd in part and vac. in part on other
grounds sub nonz Tyson v. Maher, 523 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. See generally J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW 279-81 (1978).
67. Social Welfare Courts Law (Sozialgerichtsgesetz) [SGG], Sept. 3, 1953, [1953] BGB1 I
1239, as reformulated Sept. 23, 1975, [1975] BGBI I 2535. The jurisdiction of these courts is
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not extend to the welfare law area. Accordingly, the administrative courts
hear all cases arising under the Federal Social Assistance Act. The Carter
reform proposal would have reduced this contrast in jurisdictional patterns
by making federal courts the sole arbiters of controversies arising out of the
federal welfare system.68
In addition to this variation in jurisdictional patterns, the U.S. welfare
system manifests a much higher level of court influence over welfare law
and policy. 69 During the last twenty years, American courts, especially the
Supreme Court, have taken a strong part in shaping U.S. welfare law.70
Both federal and state courts have expanded the substantive and procedural
rights of welfare recipients.71 By contrast, the German judiciary, especially
the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, has re-
sponded in a much more restrained manner when ruling on welfare law
issues.
Federalization of the American welfare system under the Carter pro-
posal might have restricted judicial influence over the development of wel-
fare law. The contrast in judicial control over state-oriented AFDC and
federalized SSI illustrates this point. To receive federal funding, state
AFDC plans must satisfy numerous specific standards established by Con-
gress and HEW.72 Courts have used these detailed standards to impose
new substantive and procedural requirements on the states by finding the
state plans in violation of the federal standards.73 But when Congress cre-
prescribed in SGG § 51. It centers on social insurance and veterans benefits. Social welfare is
not mentioned and is specifically excluded with reference to veterans, id. § 51(2).
68. No provision in the bill would have created exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.
But since many welfare cases heard by state courts involve state welfare plans that implement
federal welfare programs, the federalization of the welfare system under the Carter proposal
would have greatly reduced the amount of welfare litigation conducted in state courts.
69. Compare Leibfried, supra note 38 (reviewing pertinent decisions of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) with F. DOOLITrLE & S. DURBIN, JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS ON AFDC POLI-
CYMAKING (1977). See also 1 RECHTSPRECHUNG DEs BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHTS IN
SOZIALHILFESACHEN (1973) (compendium of decisions by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht on
BSHG cases from 1964 to 1972); 2 RECHTSPRECHUNG DES BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHTS
IN SOZIALHILFESACHEN (1977) (compendium of decisions from 1972 to 1976).
70. See Martin, Sozialrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten: Eine Einfihrung in den Status eines
neuen Arbeitsfeldes, 24 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR SOZIALREFORM 561 (1978) (listing notable United
States Supreme Court decisions in welfare law).
71. See cases cited in note 44 supra.
72. The statute authorizing states to submit AFDC plans for approval by the Secretary of
HEW establishes 23 separate requirements that a state must satisfy in order for the Secretary
to approve a plan. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1976).
73. Eg., Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972),
dismissed on other grounds on remand, 353 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (AFDC application
must be acted upon within 30 days of applicant's filing in order to comply with requirement
that "aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all eligible individuals," 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1976)).
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ated SSI, it prescribed more general standards to govern the program and
vested more discretionary authority in the Social Security Administration.74
Courts ruling on challenges to the SSI program have thus lacked detailed
standards against which to test the program and have been compelled to
rely on broad constitutional doctrines of equal protection and due proc-
ess.7 5 In addition, the SSI program includes a very elaborate internal ad-
ministrative appeals procedure,7 6 which makes court action and test cases
less likely than under the AFDC program. Both the more general stand-
ards governing the program and its more elaborate administrative appeals
structure may have limited the courts' ability to impose new requirements
on the Federal Government to benefit recipients. Adoption of a compre-
hensive reform plan like the Carter proposal could have the same effect on
a system-wide basis, reducing the number of welfare cases heard by the
courts. In this respect, too, welfare reform could strengthen the likeness of
the American system to the German model.
The greater influence that U.S. courts exercise over welfare law and
policy is partly attributable to a further difference between the two sys-
tems-the greater availability in the United States of special and concen-
trated resources for legal action. Indigents have been able to use the
services of staff attorneys from the Legal Services Program of the U.S. Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity and its successor, the Legal Services Corpo-
ration, to litigate test cases, challenging inequities in the welfare system that
affect large classes of recipients.7 7 No comparable legal services program
exists in West Germany. Instead, private practitioners handle legal matters
74. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(1) (1976) ("Benefits under this subchapter shall be paid
at such time or times and in such installments as will best effectuate the purposes of this sub-
chapter, as determined under regulations .... ").
75. E.g., Shaw v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 268, 270 (W.D.N.C. 1975):
Although the enabling statute [42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4) (1976)] allowed wide discre-
tion on the part of the Secretary, even discretion as to whether to make such payments
at all, his decision to award these benefits created a property interest in the payments.
The procedure through which applications are processed must therefore comply with
the dictates of due process.
76. 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1978).
77. Congress established the Legal Services Corporation by enacting the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976). Congress first expressly authorized
and funded legal services on a national scale in the Economic Opportunity Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, §§ 2(a)(2), 215, 80 Stat. 1451 (1966) (repealed 1974). For an analysis
of basic structural characteristics of the U.S. legal services program, see Bamberger, The Amer-
ican Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform, and Staff Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 207
(1977). For a brief history of the U.S. program, see Hollingsworth, Ten Years of Legal Services
for the Poor, in A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS 285 (1977). For an evalua-
tion of the Legal Services Corporation approach, see George, Development of the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 700-09 (1976). See also M. CAPPELLETrI, J.
GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, JR., TowARD EQUAL JusTicE 451-523 (1975); N. TROCKER,
EMPFEHLEN SICH IM INTERESSE EINER EFFEKTIVEN RECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNG FOR ALLE BOR-
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for indigent persons and receive compensation from public funds.78 This
arrangement produces easier access to lower courts79 but fewer opportuni-
ties to achieve system-wide change by successive appeals of test cases. Hor-
izontal coverage of legal needs is thus attained at the expense of vertical
coverage, court decisions rarely having as sweeping an effect as in the
United States. 80
Adoption of the Carter proposal would have reduced this difference
only slightly and in a very indirect manner. A unitary federal system would
provide more visibility to legal services lawyers. But the substitution of a
single federal system for fifty state systems would also reduce the number of
problem areas on which these attorneys concentrate.
3. Benefit Structure
Benefit structure is the result of government legal programming efforts
as modified by judicial decisions. Several benefit structure characteristics
distinguish the American and West German systems. Eligibility require-
ments present a threshold difference. In the United States, requirements
are complex and eligibility is separately determined for each program. A
person may be eligible for food stamps yet be ineligible for SSI benefits. By
contrast, West German eligibility requirements are minimal, coordinated,
and apply uniformly to applicants for all types of benefits.
The benefit structures of the U.S. and West German systems also differ
in the adequacy of payments. When measured against state needs stand-
ards and the federal poverty standard,8 ' American welfare payments gener-
ally are inadequate,82 with the exception of SSI benefits.83 Although West
GER ANDERUNGEN DES SYSTEMS DES KOSTEN- UND GEBOHRENRECHTS?, in 51-1 VERHAND-
LUNGEN DES EINUNDFONFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES B36-B47 (1976).
78. See Schlesinger, The German Alternative: A Legal Aid System of Equal Access to the
PrivateAttorney, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 213 (1977); M. CAPPELLETrI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHN-
SON, JR., supra note 77, at 386-96; H.-H. SCHROEDER-HOHENWARTH, DAS ARMENRECHT IN
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG WIRT-
SCHAFTLICHER UND RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER ASPEKTE (1976); N. TROCKER, supra note 77, at
B7-B22.
79. See N. TROCKER, supra note 77, at B40, B43.
80. See id. at B43, B45-B46.
81. See note 11 supra.
82. [D]espite the receipt of transfer income, many persons remain in poverty. The low
level of AFDC benefits in certain states contributes to this problem. For example, 37
states paid less than the full basic needs standard, as established by the state, in July
1972. In the 18 states with payment maximums under $200 per month for families of
four, the average payment standard was $142 or approximately $1,700 per year, 40
percent of the poverty line. While participation in several programs must be consid-
ered when assessing the economic well-being of welfare recipients, such participation
is uneven, with some recipients doing relatively well and others receiving benefits from
only one or two programs. Taken together, low AFDC benefits in some states and
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German benefits are not generous, they are adequate in most situations.8 4
The Carter reform proposal would have done little to reduce this disparity
in benefit levels. It would have increased payments to AFDC recipients in
twelve Southern states,85 and benefit levels would have exceeded existing
general assistance in forty-four states.8 6 Yet the proposal would not have
established anything approaching an adequate national standard.
A further difference between the two systems is that the U.S. system
places much greater emphasis on recipients' obtaining employment. Per-
sons receiving AFDC benefits must register for employment programs as a
condition to eligibility for benefits.8 7 Registrants are then placed in private
sector jobs, institutional and work experience training programs, or the
large public service employment program run by the U.S. Government.88
Monetary incentives are paid to those who participate.8 9 Those who refuse
work under the program are subject to loss of benefitsY0
uneven participation in other income support programs mean that many recipients
remain below the poverty line.
M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM
97 (1974).
83. The SSI program, unlike AFDC and food stamps, incorporates a cost of living adjust-
ment clause. This helps SSI benefits keep pace with inflation in the U.S. economy. See 42
U.S.C. § 1382f (1976).
84. See K. PETERSEN, note 48 supra; F. KLANBERG, ARMUT UND OKONOMISCHE UN-
GLEICHHEIT IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1978). Petersen's work gives the most
detailed description of the way in which benefit levels are established, including details on the
components of the "needs basket," see note 50 supra. Klanberg's work is the most comprehen-
sive discussion of the adequacy of benefit levels and the different ways to measure them.
Under 1977 average benefit levels, see note 50 supra, a family of four would receive DM 997
per month in continuous support. (This amount excludes rent and heating support payments
as well as special support assistance, all of which may total DM 400-500 depending on individ-
ual circumstances.) By contrast, under 1972 average benefit levels, a family of four would
receive DM 705 per month in continuous support. Regelsiize nach § 22 des Bundesozial-
hifegesetzes im Bundesgebiet und in Berlin (West), 25 NACHRICHTENDIENST DES DEUTSCHEN
VEREINS FOR OFFENTLICHE UND PRIVATE FORSORGE 190 (1972). The average earnings in 1977
of all industrial workers, both male and female, were DM 2002 per month, compared to DM
1394 per month in 1972. BUNDESMINISTER FOR ARBEIT UND SOZIALORDNUNG, ARBEIT UND
SOZIALSTATISTIK: HAUPTERGEBNISSE 1978, at 88.
85. Cf. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, § 1, at I, col. 2 (city ed.) (Sen. Moynihan opposes most
recent Carter plan because it would increase the share of federal funds directed to Southern
states, where benefit levels are lower).
86. For an analysis of the fiscal effect of the Carter proposal in different regions of the
United States, see ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra note 60, at 53-54.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(1976); 45 C.F.R. § 224.20(a) (1978). Certain classes of per-
sons are exempt from the registration requirement. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19)(A)(i)-(vi) (1976);
45 C.F.R. § 224.20(b) (1978).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 632(b), 633(a)(1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.40-.45 (1978).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 634 (1976) (incentive payments of $30 per month plus allowances for
transportation and other costs). See also id. § 602(a)(19)(D)(incentive payments and al-
lowances exempt from consideration as income or assets in determining eligibility for AFDC).
90. Id. § 602(a)(19)(F); 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.50-.51 (1978).
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The West German system places less emphasis on work requirements.
The public jobs program is more limited in scope, offering only small-scale,
specialized work testing on the local level.91 Withholding of benefits from
families is illegal,92 making it possible to use this penalty only against single
persons and childless couples.
The Carter proposal would have increased this disparity between the
U.S. and West German systems by setting up a much larger involuntary
public employment program.93 The program would have reduced benefits
during the job search period of eight weeks to between thirty-one and forty-
one percent of the poverty level. 94
B. ADMINISTRATION
Welfare administration is an area in which the American and West
German systems exhibit a number of differences that complement the vary-
ing patterns of legal programming in the two nations. These differences
affect both the level and structure of administration.
Vertically decentralized administration is common to both systems,
with state and local governments serving as the principal administrators of
welfare programs in both nations. In the United States, the Federal Gov-
erment administers SSI,95 but state and local governments operate the
most comprehensive programs-AFDC and food stamps.96 In West Ger-
many, local governments administer all programs97 except for certain insti-
tutional and other more expensive forms of welfare, which the state
government or its subunits administer. 98
91. BSHG §§ 19-20.
92. Id. § 25(3). As to recipients other than families, the withholding of benefits is discre-
tionary. Id. § 25(2).
93. See H.R. 9030, supra note 9, §§ 901-916; ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra note 60,
at 90-101.
94. H.R. 9030, supra note 9, § 2105(d).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1383b (1976).
96. The basic statutory pattern is to require the states to submit plans to the appropriate
federal cabinet secretary in order to receive federal funds under the particular program. 7
U.S.C.A. § 2019(e)(West 1973 & Supp. 1979)(food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1976)(AFDC).
The plans must conform to statutory and regulatory specifications in order to receive the secre-
tary's approval and federal funding. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2019(e)(West 1973 & Supp. 1979)(food
stamps); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(b), 603(a)(1976)(AFDC). The Federal Government thus exercises a
large measure of control over the administrative structure established by a state, but ultimate
responsibility rests with the state government. "It is at the State level where most of the crucial
decisions relating to AFDC eligibility and operations are made, either by the administering
agency or by the State legislature." AFDC ADMINISTRATION, upra note 43, at 15.
97. BSHG § 96. West Germany has a very highly developed system of delegated adminis-
tration. See C. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 129-34
(1968).
98. BSHG § 100.
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The effect of vertically decentralized administration is quite different in
the two countries. In the United States, the large number of participating
governmental units9 9 and the wide variation in state and local administra-
tive practices fragments welfare administration. Adoption of the Carter
proposal would have resulted in a concentration of administrative responsi-
bility in the U.S. Government. 1°° States could have elected only to perform
the "intake" function, 10 a limitation that provoked a great deal of opposi-
tion from the states during congressional consideration of the Carter bill.10 2
By making the Federal Government the administrator of welfare programs,
the Carter proposal would have lessened the structural similarity of the two
welfare systems, 10 3 but would have increased the efficiency of the U.S. sys-
tem.
A characteristic of the U.S. system not found in West Germany is a
horizontally decentralized administrative authority. The categorical char-
acter of U.S. assistance causes each program to have its own administrative
structure, procedures, rules, forms, and administrators. 1 4 For example,
99. "In 1977, more than 3,070 federal, state, and local governments were involved in ad-
ministering the welfare system." ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, supra note 60, at 104.
In West Germany 1 federal, I 1 state, and 542 local governments were involved in adminis-
tering the welfare system in 1976. [1977] STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 51-55; BSHG § 96(1). Because local jurisdictions in the larger territorial states
are subdivided, eight additional adiainistrative authorities must be added to the count at the
state level. See 0. MERGLER, G. ZINK, E. DAHLINGER & H. ZEITLER, supra note 51, at § 96,
annot. 23. In sum, there were 562 governmental units administering the welfare system in
West Germany. Both the smaller number of governmental units at the state and national
levels in West Germany and the concentration of all welfare functions in a single local agency
for each geographical area help create a more cohesive administrative structure than that in
the United States.
100. H.R. 9030, supra note 9, §§ 2131-2145.
101. Id. § 2138.
102. The National Governors' Association is concerned about a number of common
problems:
One of our major concerns is the very limited role left to the States in the adminis-
tration of cash assistance. The administration proposal would take from the States
and localities their responsibility for eligibility determination and cash payment, and
at best, would leave the States with client interviews and the processing of applica-
tions.
We feel that it is necessary for this legislation to offer the States more flexibility in
administration.
Joint Hearings supra note 10, at 1,429 (statement of Gov. Hugh Carey).
103. Nationalization of welfare administration would not be easy to achieve in West Ger-
many. Under GG art. 87(3), nationalization would be permitted only if "urgent need" (drin-
gender Bedaro existed and if the Bundesrat, the chamber of the Lander, consented. Since the
German Federal Constitution is built on the principle that the federal law is to be adminis-
tered by the states in their own right, GG art. 83, it is unlikely that the Bundesrat would
consent to nationalization.
104. See COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN WELFARE
25-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM].
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HEW supervises state administration of the AFDC program, but the De-
partment of Agriculture oversees the food stamp program. In addition,
there is little interagency administrative coordination.105 This balkanized
administration reinforces the centrifugal effect of widely dispersed legal
programming authority in the United States. It also produces a "showcase"
effect, focusing public attention on each program and its beneficiaries as a
separate entity rather than on the welfare system as a whole.10 6 This show-
case effect hardens political opposition to welfare programs and polarizes
public debate on welfare reform.
Despite the strong administrative role of local governments, adminis-
tration of the West German system is sufficiently unitary to avoid the frag-
mentation and showcase effect of the American system. Because there is
only one program for all recipients, which makes only a few internal dis-
tinctions among groups of beneficiaries, potentially vulnerable groups are
less conspicuous and the showcase effect is avoided. It is toward this kind
of pattern that the U.S. system would have moved had American programs
been consolidated in the manner proposed by the Carter reform bill.
One way in which the American system adapts to its more fragmented
administration is by a higher degree of legalization-formalization of poli-
cies and procedures in order to standardize administration and reduce dis-
cretionary authority of government officials. 10 7 Congress and HEW have
established detailed standards governing the substantive terms and proce-
dural operation of state AFDC plans.'08 In West Germany, on the other
hand, more centralized legal programming largely obviates the need for a
highly legalized welfare system.
The Carter reform proposal would have further formalized substantive
rights under U.S. law, thereby widening this difference between the two
systems. Yet federalization of welfare programs would have also reduced
the degree of procedural legalization in two ways, narrowing the difference
between the U.S. and West German systems in this respect. First, a federal
agency administering a uniform national system would have been less
likely to question decisions made by its own administrators than decisions
made by state and local officials administering the present system. Second,
Congress would have been less likely to resort to the legislative process to
105. "[W]ith only one significant exception, . . . there is no regular, formal or informal
means to coordinate the regulatory processes for income security programs that are adminis-
tered by different agencies. The one exception is the WIN program which is a legislatively
mandated joint effort." ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, supra note 104, at 46.
106. See C. LEMAN, WELFARE REFORM AND THE WORKING POOR 103-10 (1977) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation in the Harvard University Libraries).
107. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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modify a federal program and would have probably relied instead on more
flexible oversight procedures.
A feature that sharply distinguishes U.S. welfare administration from
the West German model is the vigorous American self-policing ef-
fort-attempts to detect error and fraud. Self-policing is an integral part of
U.S. welfare administration. 10 9 It operates anonymously and autonati-
cally," t0 whereas in West Germany self-policing is more individualized
and is usually activated by specific suspicions."' U.S. officials have pro-
grammed computers to check lists of recipients against government payroll
records and against lists of recipients in other states. 1t2 Computers also
perform de novo review of case decisions in order to locate error and fraud
within the administrative process, whereas the West German system lacks
systematic review of individual case decisions.
This difference between the two systems would have been heightened
by the Carter reform bill. By establishing a nationwide computer network
through which all welfare claims would have been processed, the Carter
proposal would have expanded U.S. self-policing capabilities. This com-
puter network would have made it possible to check welfare rolls against
other official records more exhaustively and to reorganize and expand qual-
ity control review of caseworker decisions. By requiring recipients to report
their income regularly, the reform bill would also have changed the func-
109. All three major federal programs have self-policing components. Federal statutes ex-
pressly provide for self-policing of the food stamp program and the work incentive component
of AFDC. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2025(d) (West Supp. 1979)(food stamp program); 42 U.S.C. § 641
(1976)(WIN program). The Secretary of HEW has used his broad authority over administra-
tion of the AFDC and SSI programs to establish self-policing efforts covering these programs.
42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(5), 1302, 1383b (1976).
For a review of U.S. self-policing efforts over the last 15 years and a description of current
programs, see AFDC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 43, at 202-51. For a statistical analysis of
U.S. self-policing efforts, see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPT OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION, AND WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT 1977. This report estimated the monetary loss from
fraud, abuse, and waste at between $6.3 billion and $7.4 billion out of $136.1 billion in federal
expenditures during fiscal 1977, or between 4.7% and 5.4%. Id. at 1-3. Losses in the AFDC
program were estimated at $669 million, id. at 91, and losses in the SSI program were set at
$334 million, id. at 92.
110. In the AFDC quality control program, state personnel, following federal guidelines,
regularly select a random sample of active cases. The state officials then review case records
kept by the welfare agency, interview the recipient, and verify eligibility and payment status.
After completing these steps, the reviewer summarizes his findings on a schedule prescribed by
HEW and forwards the information to the Federal Government. AFDC ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 43, at 223-25. The food stamp and SSI self-policing programs operate in a similar
manner. Id. at 242-44.
Ill. There is some self-policing through the General Accounting Office of the states and
through internal audits. Both are irregular efforts that are not comparable to U.S. self-policing
activities.
112. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1978, at 30, col. 1.
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tion of U.S. self-policing from a cost allocation tool to a pure management
tool.
C. FINANCING
Financing is a third area of difference in the structure of the U.S. and
West German welfare systems. As with legal programming and adminis-
*tration, the contrasts between the two systems relate primarily to the level
of governmental responsibility and the structure of welfare financing
arrangements.
Direct responsibility for financing welfare programs in the United
States usually rests with state and local governments. 13 Two important
exceptions to this pattern are federal grants-in-aid to state programs, such
as AFDC grants,"14 and federal preemption of state programs, such as by
SSI. "15 States are free to supplement federal SSI payments either directly
or through the Federal Government, but the Federal Government provides
the major share of assistance directly to recipients.
In West Germany, as in the United States, principal financial responsi-
bility for welfare programs lies with state and local governments." 6 The
only programs financed directly by the Federal Government are housing
assistance" 17 and family allowances." 8 But unlike the U.S. grants-in-aid
approach, the West German National Government exercises much less in-
direct influence over state and local financing of welfare programs. State
and local governments receive funds through general revenue sharing
plans,1 9 thereby avoiding categorical restrictions on use of the funds such
as those imposed as part of the U.S. grants-in-aid approach.
An important concomitant to the contrast between grants-in-aid and
revenue sharing is the difference between program-by-program financing in
the United States and system-wide financing in West Germany. Budget
proposals, funding debates, appropriations, and disbursement of funds are
all organized on a programmatic basis in the United States.120 Conversely,
in West Germany all of these functions are conducted for the welfare sys-
113. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 153, 356 (McKinney 1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)-(b)(1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 358(2)(McKinney 1976).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a, 1382(b)(1976).
116. See BSHG §§ 66, 99, 100.
117. See Second Rent Subsidy Law (Zweites Wohngeldgesetz) [2 WoGG], Dec. 14, 1970,
[1970] BGB1 1 1637, as reformulated Aug. 29, 1977, [1977] BGBI I 1685.
118. See Family Allowance Law (Bundeskindergeldgesetz) [BKGGI, Apr. 14, 1964, [1964]
BGBI I 265, as reformulated Jan. 31, 1975, [1975] BGB I 1412.
119. See GG art. 106; T. MAUNZ, G. DORIG & R. HERZOG, [1978] 3 KOMMENTAR ZUM
GRUNDGESETZ (commentary on GG art. 106). See also 5 Bundestagsdrucksache 2861, at 78-
80 (outlining the U.S. system of public finance and contrasting it with the West German one).
120. E.g., Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act
1979]
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tern as a whole. One consequence of this difference is that the U.S. pattern
accentuates the showcase effect of welfare administration.12'
Enactment of the Carter reform proposal would have both heightened
and reduced the contrast between the U.S. and West German financing sys-
tems. Federalization of welfare programs would have involved the U.S.
Government much more directly in financing the welfare system, strength-
ening the contrast to the decentralized financing of the West German sys-
tem. Yet the Carter bill would also have eliminated program-by-program
financing,' 22 making the U.S. system more closely resemble the West Ger-
man counterpart in this respect.
Continuity of expenditure development is another respect in which
welfare financing patterns have differed. The costs of the AFDC and food
stamp programs in the United States rose sharply beginning in 1965.123
West Germany has experienced a slow but more steady escalation of wel-
fare program costs since 1963.124 The faster pace of cost increases in the
United States can be attributed to the added burden placed on the U.S.
welfare system by the American social crisis of the 1960's and to the resil-
iency of the highly bureaucratic German welfare administration when con-
fronted with political pressures. The effect of the Carter reform bill on this
disparity in expenditure growth rates cannot be determined, since estimates
of the program's added cost were highly variable and hotly disputed.' 25
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, 92 Stat. 1567 (1978)(separate appropriations for SSI program,
AFDC program, and work incentive program).
121. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
122. H.R. 9030, supra note 9, § 2133.
123. "In 1965, expenditure on federal social programs directed toward low-income groups
amounted to $6 billion. . . . By 1968, federal expenditure on such programs had risen to $12
billion. . . . By 1972, the comparable figure was $24 1/2 billion. ... Skidmore, Growth in
SocialPrograms, 1964-74, in R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, PROGRESS AoAINST POVERTY 11
(1975). See also S. DANZIGER, R. HAVEMAN & E. SMOLENSKY, supra note 54, at 3 (percentage
of gross national product spent on income-tested programs increased from 1.3% in 1965 to
2.8% in 1974 because of increases in number of recipients and average benefit per recipient).
124. In 1965, 0.47% of the West German gross national product was spent implementing
the BSHG. Percentages in more recent years have been 0.5 1% in 1970, 0.60% in 1972, 0.75% in
1974, and 0.91% in 1977. Expenditures rose from DM 2.18 billion in 1965 to DM 10.90 billion
in 1977. The main growth period in West German welfare system expenditures began in
1970-71 and slowed down after 1975. Growth rates ranged from a maximum of 28% per year
to a minimum of 15.6% per year. See BUNDESMINISTER FOR ARBEIT UND SOZIALORDNUNO,
SOZIALBERICHT '78, at 170-71; Materialband zum Sozialbudget, Bundesratsdrucksache 252/
76, at 475-76. This growth is due to the indexing of benefit levels, the addition of young or
working age people to the welfare rolls, and a cost explosion in special aid expenditures, espe-
cially in the area of homemaker and attendant care services for the handicapped, due mainly
to rising costs for institutionalized care (rising of the Jyfegesdtze).
125. For one estimate of the Carter proposal's costs, see ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL, Supra
note 60, at 37-56.
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Comparison of the American and West German welfare systems thus
points up a number of important structural differences. Legal program-
uing of the U.S. system is more decentralized, more heavily influenced by
decisions of both state and federal courts, and has produced inadequate
benefit levels hemmed by complex eligibility and work requirements. U.S.
welfare administration reflects greater horizontal fragmentation, legaliza-
tion, and self-policing. Financing of the U.S. system is organized on a
grant-in-aid basis rather than on revenue sharing principles as in West Ger-
many, and expenditures have escalated much more sharply over the last
fifteen years in the United States.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Underlying the structural differences between the American and West
German welfare systems are four more basic political contrasts that create
different climates for welfare reform, illustrate the essential character of the
Carter proposal, and suggest at least a partial explanation of why Congress
failed to enact it. First, state and local governments operate more inde-
pendently of the national government in the United States than in West
Germany, producing greater vertical fragmentation of the American politi--
cal framework. Second, this fragmentation has spawned a tax system in
which revenue sources for government social welfare programs can be eas-
ily identified and made the focal point of attacks on the welfare system.
Third, Congress has taken a categorical approach when planning and fund-
ing legislative programs to address social problems. Fourth, the American
National Government is less centralized than its West German counterpart,
with a host of administrative agencies directing an array of federal pro-
grams.
All of these factors contribute to a more fragmented political situation
in the United States and create a different reform context than in West Ger-
many. Welfare reform in the United States only occurs when a high crisis
threshold is surpassed as in the Great Depression 12 6 or during the 1960's.127
This reform pattern of pressure politics contrasts sharply with the bureau-
cratic politics characteristic of West Germany. The greater political impor-
tance of social classes and trade unions in West Germany128 has led to the
126. See F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 45-119 (1971); F.F. PIVEN &
R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 41-95 (1977).
127. REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 126, at 183-340; POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS,
supra note 126, at 264-361.
128. The rate of unionization in West Germany is higher than in the United States. Aver-
age unionization of nonagricultural workers and salaried employees for the years 1965 to 1974
amounted to 39%, compared to 28-29% in the United States. E. Kassalow, Industrial Conflict
19791
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creation of institutional structures for dealing with political issues that
might arouse class antagonisms. Conflicts over welfare policy are handled
within this institutional framework and are thereby routinized and de-
politicized. 29
These different reform patterns may explain the two outstanding inno-
vations in the U.S. system: outreach programs 130 and the Legal Services
Corporation. 131 Both may be thought of as byproducts of abrupt, rapid
modernization of U.S. welfare law. By contrast, the bureaucratic structure
of the West German system diminishes the potential for such radical depar-
tures from the status quo and promotes gradual, incremental legal change.
The basic political differences underlying.the structural variations in
the U.S. and West German welfare systems also illuminate the Carter re-
form proposal as a plan for administrative reform rather than reform of the
content of welfare programs. The changes the Carter plan would have
made in legal programming, administration, and financing would have af-
fected three of the four basic political differences between the two countries.
By concentrating legal programming, administrative, and financing author-
ity in the Federal Government, the Carter proposal would have substan-
tially diminished the role of state and local governments. Local property
taxes would likewise have ceased to be a source of financial support for
welfare programs. And by establishing a single national program, albeit
one administered by multiple federal agencies, the Carter plan would have
diminished the programmatic orientation of the U.S. system. The adminis-
trative character of the Carter proposal can be seen even in the jobs compo-
nent, where the most substantial changes affecting recipients would have
been made. Here the principal effect of the proposal would have been to
remove work-testing from the private labor market and bring it into the
public sector by organizing a small public labor market.132
The most substantial changes the Carter bill would have made are thus
not reforms of welfare policy, but changes essentially administrative in
and Consensus in the United States and Western Europe, in 30 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RE-
SEARCH ASSOCIATION PROC. (1977). Yet comparative union membership statistics are not the
only indicator of the relative importance of unions. In West Germany, unions are much more
significant as comprehensive social institutions. Even unions that represent relatively few em-
ployees are significant partners in collective bargaining, since bargaining results usually bind
the entire labor force in that type of employment.
129. See Tennstedt, Zur Okonomisierung und Verrechtlichung in der Soziapolitik, in
STAATLICHE POLITIK IM SOZIALSEKTOR 139 (A. Murswieck ed. 1976).
130. See Note, Outreach: Bringing the Eligible into Federal Assistance Programs, 62 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1093 (1977).
131. See note 77 supra.
132. See B. FRIEDMAN & L. HAUSMAN, WORK, WELFARE, AND THE PROGRAM FOR BET-
TER JOBS AND INCOME (1977).
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character. Yet the importance of these changes should not be underesti-
mated, since each is directed at one of the most formidable obstacles to
reform of the content of U.S. welfare programs. State and local govern-
ments have often resisted reforms of welfare law and administration that
would impose greater financial burdens on them or require them to adopt
more complicated procedures in the interest of due process. A tax system
that relies in part on state and local property tax assessments to support
welfare programs makes the monetary sources of welfare assistance readily
identifiable to critics who wish to attack welfare programs and their high
cost. Furthermore, the categorical approach of the U.S. system and the hor-
izontal fragmentation of authority have acted as internal barriers to reform
of the content of welfare programs. By breaking down these barriers to
welfare reform, the Carter proposal would have made reform of the content
of welfare programs more readily attainable. Yet largely because the re-
form plan directly challenged the strongest impediments to welfare reform
in a political situation that appeared to lack the urgency of the Great De-
pression or the 1960's, Congress failed to enact the Carter proposal.
CONCLUSION
Comparative analysis of the U.S. and West German welfare systems
serves a number of important functions. Most immediately, it highlights
the structural differences between the two systems in the areas of legal pro-
gramming, administration, and financing. This comparison provides an
index against which reform proposals may be measured to gauge the
directions in which they would shape welfare law and policy. In addition,
comparative analysis suggests the deeper political differences underlying
the structural contrasts in welfare systems, highlights the different reform
contexts in which reform proposals are developed, and suggests the rela-
tionship between reform proposals and the basic political differences and
reform contexts.
Yet despite the broad sweep of the comparative analysis developed in
this Article, much remains for further study. Additional analysis could ilu-
minate in greater detail the reasons for the structural contrasts between the
two national systems, focusing also on the relationship between welfare and
social insurance. The nature and effect of U.S. reform efforts as well as the
U.S. system's gradual evolution toward the West German model would also
benefit from further comparative study. On a broader scale, analysis of the
two national welfare systems may also reveal how the confluence of several
fields of law-family law, administrative law, and constitutional law-pro-
duces different patterns in the two countries. Comparative study of welfare
law may also serve as an index of national social and moral development
1979]
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and as a means to study the relationship between law and the state in west-
em nations. 33 All of these broad concerns are far beyond the scope of this
Article. But it is hoped that the present study may provide the impetus for
continued comparative analysis of the U.S. and West German welfare
systems.' 3
4
133. For a seminal study of these questions, see ten Broeck, California's Dual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Preseut Status (pts. I-II), 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 900
(1964), 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965).
134. Traditionally studies in comparative law have focused almost completely on private
law. Public law, and especially welfare law in its broadest meaning, were neglected. In recent
years there have been small indications of change. See, e.g., G. IGo, B. SCHULTE & T. SIMONS,
EINFiiHRUNG IN DAS RECHT DER SOZIALEN SICHERHEIT VON FRANKREICH, GROP BRITAN-
NIEN UND ITALIEN (1978); SOZIALRECHTSVERGLEICH IM BEZUGSRAHMEN INTERNATIONALEN
UND SUPRANATIONALEN RECHTS (1978); METHODISCHE PROBLEME DES SOZIALRECHTSVER-
GLEICHS (1977). All these studies tend to concentrate on comparative social insurance.
